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Sympathy for the Devil':
How the Ohio Tort Reform Act Creates a
Flawed System of Punitive Damages
BRBT McCoMB WALL*
This Comment discusses the dilemmas surrounding Ohio's tort reform
legislation, which limits plaintiffs to only one punitive damage award for a tort
arising out of a single course of conduct. This "one-bite" provision is analyzed
in terms of its restrictions on punitive damage awards, its impact on the basic
goals of tort law (such as deterrence and law enforcement), and its detrimental
effect on plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Noting the problems of politicization of
the issue and the lack of national uniformity in awarding punitive damages, the
author suggests a series of procedural and judicial safeguards that would
obviate the need for legislation limiting plaintiffs' tort recoveries. The Comment
concludes with a prediction that Ohio's tort reform legislation will face
constitutional challenges in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
"I pledge allegiance to the easy dollar of the United States civil court. And
to the judges and juries who award megabuck settlements. One nation, run by
lawyers, with unearned wealth and easy money for All! In Litigation We Trust,
Amen! "2
Few topics in the law are more widely discussed and more widely
misunderstood by the public than the law of torts and the doctrine of punitive
damages. Anecdotal stories of plaintiffs receiving million dollar awards for
spilling coffee on themselves3 or finding scratches on their new cars4 have
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1 TE ROLuNG STONES, Syathy for the Devil, on BEGGARS BANQUET (Abkco
Records 1968).
2 Rob Korte, Coffee, Tea, or Oops! How About a Lawsuit?, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan.
22, 1997, at 8A.
3 See Leibeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL
360309 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994) ($2.7 million punitive damage award, reduced to
$480,000 on appeal, then settled). See Elizabeth Sherowski, Hot Coffee, Cold Cash: Making
the Most of Alternative Dispute Resolution in High-Stakes Personal Injury Lawsuits, 11 Omo
ST. J. oN DISP. RESOL. 521, 522 & n.6, 523 n.10 (1996).
4 See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (finding a two
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reinforced popular beliefs that the tort litigation system is irrational and
spiraling out of control. 5 Ultimately, these beliefs result in widespread
antagonism towards punitive damage awards and in sympathy for tortfeasors. 6
This atmosphere helps mobilize political support for interest groups desiring to
"re-establish control" over the tort litigation system.7 Interest groups re-
establish control by lobbying the legislature to pass laws which limit the scope
and frequency of punitive damage awards. 8
This circumscription is, however, diametrically opposed to the goals of tort
law, which are predicated on the belief that "the people" are best protected
against the harmful conduct of tortfeasors through the powers of self-protection
given to them by the judicial system.9 The tort system assumes that placing the
power to punish outrageous conduct in the hands of the people is wiser than
placing that power in the hands of the tortfeasor via the tortfeasor's ability to
influence the legislature. Ironically, the public disagrees.10 Not only is it strange
million dollar punitive damage award for distributor that covered scratches on new cars to be
excessive).
5 See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75
MINN. L. Ray. 1, 3-4 (1990) (debunling the public perception that punitive damage awards
are large in size and frequent in occurrence); see also Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1147, 1159-62, 1242-44 (1992) (same).
6 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 18-22 (describing how stories of a few unusual
punitive damage awards lead people to believe the legal system is unfairly punishing
defendants); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing
Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REV. 1, 36-85 (1992) (demonstrating
through empirical studies that punitive damages are not excessive in the products liability
context); Saks, supra note 5, at 1159-68 (describing the impact of anecdotal evidence on
common beliefs about punitive damage awards).
7 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 10-14 (illustrating how popular outrage with
punitive damage awards is utilized to garner political support).
8 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 10-14 (suggesting that anecdotal evidence is
generated by interest groups because it appeals to emotion and thus facilitates advantageous
legislation); cf. Saks, supra note 5, at 1160-61 (suggesting that the persuasive power of
anecdotes is used by reformers to further their agendas).
9 See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MIcH. L.
REv. 1258, 1258-67, 1277-99 (1976) (discussing the doctrine and functions of punitive
damages). See generally W. PAGE KEErN Er AL., PROSSER AND KEEToN ON THE LAW OF
TORTs § 2 (Sth ed. 1984).
10 See Rustad, supra note 6, at 36-85 (comparing the most common assumptions
concerning punitive damages to empirical data on the frequency and size of actual punitive
damage awards); Saks, supra note 5, at 1163 (discussing the popularly held belief that
punitive damage awards are routinely awarded in excessive amounts). Professor Saks points
out the irony of a public belief that punitive damages are excessive: "How can we explain the
paradox that the people who declare awards to be excessive... are the same people... who
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that the people support laws which take away their power to punish those who
harm them, but it is paradoxical that the same public which sets punitive
damage amounts also declares them to be excessive. Yet these beliefs, largely
based on misconceptions, facilitate legislation that allows tortfeasors to engage
in outrageous conduct without fear of facing meaningful punishment.
Unfortunately, the Ohio Tort Reform Act" (the "Act") is an example of such
legislation.
Since its introduction in the Ohio House of Representatives, 12 House Bill
350 (the "Bill") has been the subject of a great deal of legal, 13 political,14 and
social15 discourse in Ohio. 16 The Bill, which was signed into law October 28,
1996 by Governor George Voinovich, 17 makes sweeping changes in Ohio's
existing tort law'8 and represents a significant victory for business entities inside
and outside Ohio. 19 One of the more significant provisions of the Act, Ohio
Revised Code section 2315.21(D) limits both the amount of punitive damages
make those awards?" Id. at 1163 n.41.
11 Am. Sub. H.R. 350, 121st Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1996).
12 Columbus Republican Patrick Tiberi introduced Bill 350 in the Ohio House of
Representatives on May 22, 1995. See 1996 (No. 10) Ohio Legis. Bull. lxi (Anderson).
13 See, e.g., Mark Tatge, Republicans Vow Fight to Cap Jury Awards, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), May 24, 1996, at B5 (discussing the positions of the Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers and the National Federation of Independent Business concerning punitive damage
caps).
14 See, e.g., id. (printing comments concerning punitive damage caps from Governor
George Voinovich and various members of the Ohio General Assembly).
15 See, e.g., Korte, supra note 2, at 8A ("Americans are not just sue-happy, they're
lawsuit-obsessed.").
16 Discussions concerning tort reforms have also taken place within the larger federal
debate. See, e.g., Roger K. Lowe & Catherine Candisky, "Excessive" Punitive Damages
Ruled Out, CoLuMBus DiSPATCH, May 21, 1996, at 1A (commenting on reactions to punitive
damage awards from the judicial, executive, and congressional branches of the federal
government). While providing a fertile source of quotations, this environment has generated
considerable amounts of rash and hyperbolic commentary. Given the immediate and practical
implications for Ohio citizens, there is a great need for tempered discourse in an area of the
law which is easily and often misunderstood.
17 See 1996 (No. 10) Ohio Legis. Bull. lxi (Anderson). House Bill 350 became effective
January 25, 1997. See id.
18 Some of the Bill's more noteworthy changes include: caps on plaintiff recovery for
non-economic damages; limitations on joint and several liability; a fifteen-year statute of
repose for certain real property and product liability causes of action; a two-year statute of
limitation for employment discrimination; a complete bar to recovery in certain comparative
fault situations; limitations on market-share liability; and caps on punitive damages. See
generally Am. Sub. H.R. 350, 121st Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1996).
19 See infra Part IlI.B-C.
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and the number of times that punitive damages may be recovered under Ohio
law against a defendant for a single course of conduct.20 This provision raises
20 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D) (Anderson Supp. 1996). Ohio Revised
Code § 2315.21(D) reads in part as follows:
(1)(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (D)(3)(b) of this section, the court
shall not enter judgment for punitive or exemplary damages in excess of the lesser of
three times the amount of the compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff from that
defendant or one hundred thousand dollars, as determined pursuant to division (B)(2) or
(3) of this section.
(b) If the defendant is a large employer, except as otherwise provided in division
(D)(3)(b) of this section, the court shall not enter judgment for punitive or exemplary
damages in excess of the greater of three times the amount of the compensatory damages
awarded to the plaintiff from that defendant or two hundred fifty thousand dollars, as
determined pursuant to division (3)(2) or (3) of this section.
(3)(a) In any tort action, except as provided in division (D)(3)(b) of this section,
punitive or exemplary damages shall not be awarded against any defendant if that
defendant files with the court a certified judgment, judgment entries, or other evidence
showing that punitive or exemplary damages have already been awarded and have been
collected, in any state or federal court, against that defendant based on the same act or
course of conduct that is alleged to have caused the injury or loss to person or property
for which the plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and that the aggregate of those
previous punitive or exemplary damage awards exceeds one hundred thousand dollars
or, if the defendant is a large employer, two hundred fifty thousand dollars.
(b) Notwithstanding division (D)(3)(a) of this section, punitive or exemplary
damages may be awarded against a defendant in either of the following types of tort
actions:
(i) In subsequent tort actions involving the same act or course of conduct for which
punitive or exemplary damages have already been awarded, if the court determines by
clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff will offer new and substantial evidence of
previously undiscovered, additional behavior as described in division (C) of this section
on the part of that defendant, other than the injury or loss for which the plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages. In that case the court shall make specific findings of fact in the
record to support its conclusion. The court shall reduce the amount of any punitive or
exemplary damages otherwise awardable pursuant to this section by the sum of the
punitive or exemplary damages awards previously rendered against the defendant in any
state or federal court. The court shall not inform the jury about the court's determination
and action under division (D)(3)(b)(i) of this section.
(ii) In subsequent tort actions involving the same act or course of conduct for which
punitive or exemplary damages have already been awarded, if the court determines by
clear and convincing evidence that the total amount of prior punitive or exemplary
damages awards was totally insufficient to punish that defendant's behavior as described
1026 [Vol. 58:1023
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both doctrinal and constitutional concerns, but more importantly section
2315.21(D) is pragmatically ineffective and signifies disturbing policy decisions
by the Ohio General Assembly.
This Comment offers a critical analysis of the limitations placed on punitive
damages by the Ohio Tort Reform Act. Part II examines the functional and
doctrinal goals underlying the law of torts and the doctrine of punitive damages.
This Part will also consider the recent politicization of the tort litigation system
and present the due process concerns frequently expressed regarding punitive
damage awards in the mass tort context. Part III analyzes the practical,
doctrinal, constitutional, and political dimensions of the Act. Part IV offers an
alternative means of balancing the goals of tort law and the due process interests
of mass tortfeasors through a system of increased procedural safeguards. Part V
concludes that the Ohio Tort Reform Act will be challenged on constitutional
grounds in Ohio courts.
I. GOALS OF TORT LAW
"The law of torts... is concerned with the allocation of losses arising out
of human activities .... "21 Simply stated, tort law seeks to strike a balance
between a plaintiff's right to protection against harm and a defendant's right to
freedom of action. 22 Tort law concerns itself not only with conduct that is
harmful to the individual, but also with conduct that is socially harmful. 23 The
law of torts, therefore, is a means by which the people can control the conduct
of civil wrongdoers adversely affecting their community.24 In the case of
in division (C) of this section and to deter that defendant and others from similar
behavior in the future. In that case the court shall make specific findings of fact in the
record to support its conclusion. The court shall reduce the amount of any punitive or
exemplary damages otherwise awardable pursuant to this section by the sum of the
punitive or exemplary damages awards previously rendered against the defendant in any
state or federal court. The court shall not inform the jury about the court's determination
and action under division (D)(3)(b)(ii) of this section.
OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(1)(a)-(b), (3)(a)-(b) (Anderson Supp. 1996).
21 KEETON Er AL., supra note 9, § 1, at 6.
22 See id. See generally 1 STUART M. SPEiER Er AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS
§ 1:27 (1983) (describing tort law as a means of balancing competing interests in society).23 See KEsrON Er AL., supra note 9, § 1, at 7 (stating that tort law acts as a means of
insuring social control over wrongdoers).
24 See KEnToN Er AL., supra note 9, § 2 (discussing the doctrinal aspects of punitive
damages and tort law); 1 SPEi E ErAL., supra note 22, § 1:27, at 84 (portraying tort law as
a means of social control over private and public institutions); Owen, supra note 9, at 1262-
68 (discussing the doctrinal aspects of punitive damages and tort law).
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particularly outrageous conduct, the law of torts allows for the imposition of
punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages.25
The doctrine of punitive damages is firmly rooted in the common law of
the United States and can be traced back thousands of years to numerous
civilizations. 26 Punitive damages are intended to punish a defendant for
outrageous misconduct and to deter him and others similarly situated from such
conduct in the future. 27 Forcing the defendant to pay a substantial monetary
fine for her outrageous conduct also serves as a form of revenge for the plaintiff
and society as a whole.28 These doctrinal goals are accomplished, though, only
if outrageous conduct results in consistent and meaningful punishment.2
9
Several leading scholars also suggest that punitive damages encourage law
enforcement and compensate plaintiffs for losses not ordinarily recoverable.
30
25 See KEErON ET AL., supra note 9, § 2, at 9; 2 SPEISER ET AL.., supra note 22, § 8:45,
at 802.
26 See, e.g., Owen, supra note 9, at 1262-64. Professor Owen points out that punitive
damages were available "4000 years ago in the Code of Hammurabi, the earliest known legal
code." Id. at 1262 n.17 (citing G. DRivnR & J. MILES, THm BABYLONIAN LAws 500, 500-01
(1952)). Hittite, Hebrew, Hindu, and Roman civil laws also contained provisions for damages
that were punitive in nature. See id. Professor Owen states that the "case that first
articulated... 'exemplary' damages in English law [was] Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205
(K.B. 1763)." Id. at 1263 n.19. He further states that "[t]he first reported punitive damages
decision in this country appears to be Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C. 3, 1 Bay 6 (1784), in which the
plaintiff became ill after consuming a glass of wine containing a large quantity of Spanish Fly
that the defendant had added as a practical joke." Id. at 1263 n.20. For additional information
on the historical nature of punitive damages, see James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr.,
Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1119-24
(1984).
27 See KEEroN Er AL., supra note 9, § 2, at 9; 1 SPEISER Er AL., supra note 22, § 1:32,
at 108; Owen, supra note 9, at 1265.
2 8 See Owen, supra note 9, at 1280; see also JERE MY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF
LEGISLATION 309 (1931) ("'That pleasure [of revenge] is a gain; it calls to mind Samson's
riddle-it is the sweet coming out of the terrible, it is honey dripping from the lion's
mouth."); ROBERT KEaTON, VENTuRING TO Do JuSTICE 152 (1969) (positing that the plaintiff
will find pleasure in the fact that the law validates vengeful feelings). In addition, "[t]he
punishment of offenders... reinforces the confidence of the liw-abider in the basic fairness
of the legal system and in the utility of his personal decision to obey the law." Owen, supra
note 9, at 1281.
29 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 1.5, at 25
(2d ed. 1986) ("The magnitude of the threatened punishment is clearly a factor [in
deterrence], but perhaps not as important a consideration as the probability of discovery and
punishment."); RIcHARD POSNER, EcoNomc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.11, at 142-43 (2d ed.
1977).
30 See KEETONET AL., supra note 9, § 2, at 9; 2 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 22, § 8:45,
at 802; Owen, supra note 9, at 1287-98.
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Law enforcement is encouraged because punitive damage awards provide
monetary incentive for plaintiffs to bring outrageous civil wrongdoers to
justice. 31 An outrageous tortfeasor that has caused great harm to society by
injuring a large number of plaintiffs may escape punitive liability if each
individual plaintiff suffers minor compensatory damage. This is because the
high cost of litigation makes pursuit of such claims economically unproductive.
But, "the prospect of punitive damages recoveries induces injured plaintiffs to
act as 'private attorneys general'" 32 thus insuring that the wrongdoer is held
accountable for his behavior.
Similarly, plaintiffs receiving compensation for their injuries are often not
reimbursed for the cost of bringing their case to trial. 33 In this manner
compensatory damages fail to return the plaintiff to the status quo ante. 34
Punitive damages, therefore, serve to compensate the plaintiff for expenses that
would not have been incurred but for the defendant's conduct.
The doctrine of punitive damages is, however, not without its critics. 35
Indeed, some commentators suggest that the doctrine of punitive damages is a
relic that has outlived its usefulness and should be abolished entirely.36 Most
criticism, though, has focused on reforming punitive damages. 37 The perceived
need for reform is based upon the popularly held belief that punitive damages
31 See Owen, supra note 9, at 1287-88.
32 Id.
33 See id. at 1295-99.
34 See id. at 1297.
35 See, e.g., L.S. (Bob) Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated
Argumentative Outline, 11 FORUM 57 (1975) (suggesting that punitive damages be
eliminated); Sales & Cole, supra note 26, at 1154-65 (arguing that punitive damages are no
longer useful to society and should be abolished); Hugh Evander Willis, Measure of Damages
When Property Is Wrongfuly Taken by a Private Individual, 22 HARv. L. REV. 419, 420
(1909) (suggesting that punitive damages be eliminated).
36 See generally James E. Duffy, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be
Abolished, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., INC., THE CASE AGAiNST PUNmnvE DAMAGES 8
(1969); Sales & Cole, supra note 26.
37 See, e.g., Dennis Neil Jones et al., Multiple Punitive Awards for a Single Course of
Wrongful Conduct: The Need for a National Policy to Protect Due Process, 43 ALA. L. REv.
1 (1991) (expressing the need for a federal class action procedure to protect defendants from
multiple and excessive awards of punitive damages); Jerry J. Phillips, Multiple Punitive
Damage Awards, 39 ViiL. L. REV. 433 (1994) (suggesting bankruptcy as a viable means of
avoiding multiple punitive damage awards); Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass
Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efflciency, and Control, 52 FORDHAM
L. REV. 37 (1983) (stating as an alternative approach the use of a class action procedure to
protect defendants from multiple and excessive awards of punitive damages).
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are routinely awarded, and that they are awarded in large amounts.38 Critics
also assert that punitive damage awards are not really damages at all, but rather
they are quasi-criminal sanctions assessed without the procedural safeguards
granted to criminal defendants. 39 Public sympathy, which centers around these
concerns, is most evident in the context of mass tort litigation because a
defendant can face multiple awards of punitive damages for a single course of
conduct.40
38 See, e.g., Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 3-4. The authors state:
Contemporary critics of punitive damages confidently claim that the doctrine has
specific and demonstrable negative effects reaching crisis proportions. Four
straightforward, empirical propositions underlie these claims: punitive damages are
routinely awarded; they are awarded in large amounts; the frequency and size of those
awards have been rapidly increasing; and these phenomena are national in scope.
Id. See also Saks, supra note 5, at 1149-67 (noting that the popular belief that the tort
litigation system is out of control is not supported by empirical studies); Jennifer Washburn,
Bill Hogties Tort Limits, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Apr. 2, 1996, at B9 (commenting on the
widely held belief that tort suits and outrageous damage awards stifle free enterprise).
39 See, e.g., Seltzer, supra note 37, at 43. Assuming arguendo the validity of this
argument, it begs the question why the civil justice system should provide criminal safeguards
for quasi-criminal behavior. It would seem that the more appropriate action would be to create
quasi-criminal safeguards. See infra Part IV.
40 See Charles D. Stewart & Phillip G. Piggott, Punitive Damages Since Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 16 AM. J. TRIALADvoc. 693, 697 (1993). Stewart and Piggott
observed that:
Jury decisions are growing at an alarming rate in the United States. The top ten
jury verdicts alone exceeded $670 million in 1991, a staggering forty-one percent
increase over the total for 1990. Such figures may be appreciated by a few attorneys and
the clients they represent. However, if jury awards continue to increase, corporate
America will not be able to aggressively compete in today's international marketplace.
Id. See also Paul Vollman, Lawsuits Tame Corporate Power, CIN. ENQUIRER, May 11, 1996,
at A15 (stating that news of "jackpot verdicts evoke[s] outrage against the judicial system" for
irrationally punishing defendants); Kurt Waltzer, Tort-Reform Bill Would Hurt Ordinary
Ohioans, CoLUMBus DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 1996, at All (commenting that although Ohioans
want an end to frivolous lawsuits, the tort reform bill would injure Ohio citizens at the
expense of large business).
Indeed, popular culture has become fascinated with stories of greedy plaintiffs and
lawyers that sue innocent defendants. See Saks, supra note 5, at 1150-68 (illustrating the
prevalence of anecdotal evidence and factoids that shape people's beliefs about the tort system
in modem society). For a list of cases dealing with the propriety of awarding punitive
damages to separate plaintiffs bringing successive claims arising out of a single course of
conduct, see Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, "First Comer" Doctrine of Punitive Damages, 11
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The problem of exposing a defendant to multiple awards of punitive
damages for a single course of conduct was first examined over thirty years ago
by Judge Friendly in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.41 Judge Friendly
pointed out that a mass tortfeasor facing hundreds of lawsuits in which plaintiffs
sought punitive damages for an injury caused by a single action could produce
"staggering" inequities.42 As Judge Friendly explained, "[w]e have the gravest
difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity
of actions throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill." 43
Naturally, commentators consider this problem in light of the perceived
characteristics of tort litigation today.44 These commentators frequently
conclude that punitive damage overkill will reach unprecedented heights due to
the mass tort litigation that is "sweeping the nation." 45
In addition to fears of the "severe economic impact" these "mind
boggling" 46 awards will have on the economy, commentators question whether
multiple awards of punitive damages violate the due process rights of
defendants. 47 First, scholars state that punitive damages expose a defendant to
A.L.R. 4th 1261 (1982).
In addition, the fact that an injured plaintiff has no "right" to a punitive damage award is
frequently cited as further evidence of the inequities to which defendants are exposed. See,
e.g., N. Todd Leishman, Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp.: Toward Due Process Limitations
on Multiple Awards of Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation, 1990 UTAH L. REv. 439,
446 (stating that a plaintiff's claim to punitive damages is diminished by the fact that the
plaintiff has no right to the award).
41378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
42 Id. at 839.
43Id.
44 See, e.g., Jones et al., supra note 37, at 1-2 (suggesting that a national policy
considering the aggregate amount of punitive damages be adopted to protect defendants facing
multiple punitive damage awards); Seltzer, supra note 37, at 37-42 (proposing the use of a
class action procedure to protect defendants from multiple awards of punitive damages).
45 See Jones et al., supra note 37, at 1-2 ("Mhe advent of mass tort litigation has swept
the nation, creating an unprecedented phenomenon of multiple punitive damage awards
assessed against a defendant for a single course of conduct.").
46 Sales & Cole, supra note 26, at 1118.
47 See, e.g., Jones et al., supra note 37; Stewart & Piggott, supra note 40. In fact, these
concerns are expressed by the Ohio General Assembly in the Tort Reform Act. See Am. Sub.
H.R. 350, § 5(B)(1)(b), 121st Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1996), 1996 Ohio
Legis. Bull. 2046, 2110 (Anderson) (stating that multiple awards of punitive damages violate
a defendant's due process rights). The Ohio General Assembly also states that multiple
awards of punitive damages have resulted in violations of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibitions against excessive fines. See id. This is, no doubt, a reaction to the Supreme Court
ruling in Aleander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993), in which the Court held that civil
awards would qualify as fines under the Eighth Amendment. See Alexander, 509 U.S. at
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severe punishment without corresponding safeguards to insure fair treatment at
trial.4s Second, because all punishment for a single action should be finite and
proportionate to the wrong committed, repeated and unpredictable punishment
for a single action offends basic notions of fairness and justice to which all
wrongdoers are entitled.49
It is against this backdrop that the Ohio Tort Reform Act was enacted.
III. THE Ouo TORT REFORM ACT
A. Preemption or Protection?-A Practical Look at Giving Ohio
Citizens One Bite at the Punitive Damages Apple
In amending section 2315.21(D), the Ohio General Assembly intended to
protect mass tortfeasors from "excessive and occasionally multiple awards of
punitive or exemplary damages that have no rational legal connection to [their]
wrongful actions or omissions." 50 The General Assembly found that multiple
awards of punitive damages have resulted in the excessive punishment of
tortfeasors for a single course of conduct. 51 Accordingly, injured plaintiffs can
now recover only one punitive damage award per defendant per course of
conduct under Ohio law.52
558-59. However, because the constitutional objection that multiple awards of punitive
damages can expose defendants to excessive fines is, in part, presupposed by the due process
objection, this Comment addresses only the latter. For an interesting discussion of the Eighth
Amendment and multiple awards of punitive damages for a single course of conduct, see
Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive
Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 101 (1995).
48 See, e.g., Seltzer, supra note 37, at 43.
49 See, e.g., Jones et al., supra note 37, at 3-4 ("[A]t some point the aggregate amount
of multiple punitive damages becomes fundamentally unfair, in violation of the Due Process
Clause.").
50 Am. Sub. H.R. 350, § 5(B)(1)(b), 121st Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Ohio
1996), 1996 Ohio Legis. Bull. 2046, 2110 (Anderson).
51 See id.
52 See Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D) (Anderson Supp. 1996). Allowing a single
award of punitive damages against a defendant per course of conduct is commonly referred to
as the "one-bite" or "first-comer" doctrine. See, e.g., Nadel, supra note 40. It is true that the
General Assembly does allow multiple awards of punitive damages for a single course of
conduct up to a prescribed ceiling amount or in the event that a judge determines the
prescribed ceiling amount was inadequate to deter or punish the particular tortfeasor. See
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(3)(a), (b)(ii) (Anderson Supp. 1996). However, these
divisions will have very limited application. See infra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
Moreover, Ohio judges may tend to use these divisions sparingly given the General
Assembly's clearly stated prohibitions against multiple punitive damage awards.
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Assuming arguendo the validity of the Ohio General Assembly's findings,
the "one-bite" provision will accomplish its goal of protecting mass tortfeasors
in only two situations. Furthermore, any protection that might be extended to
defendants will be governed as much by rules of civil procedure as by Ohio's
Tort Reform Act.
The first situation in which section 2315.21(D) will afford protection from
multiple punitive damage awards occurs when a mass tortfeasor is subject to
jurisdiction exclusively within the confines of Ohio. This scenario will, of
course, force the plaintiff to sue the tortfeasor under Ohio law, thus implicating
the Act's punitive damages limitation. 53 However, such an occurrence will be
rare because most mass tortfeasors subject to multiple awards of punitive
damages are interstate business entities subject to jurisdiction in a number of
states.54 In addition, an exclusively intrastate business is often subject to
litigation outside of Ohio when it causes tortious injuries beyond Ohio's state
lines.55 These jurisdictional issues are of paramount importance because, in the
absence of a deferential conflict of laws statute, 56 each of the aforementioned
scenarios will result in another state's tort law controlling the controversy, thus
eliminating any protections afforded to mass tortfeasors under the Act.57
53 See generally 4 STAMEY E. HARPER, JR. & MICHAEL E. SOLOMINE, ANDERSON'S
OHIO CIvIL PRACICE § 146.03 (1996) (explaining Ohio's rules governing personal
jurisdiction). Parties could, of course, agree that any dispute arising between them be
governed by Ohio law. In this case, the tortfeasor would not need to be subject to jurisdiction
in Ohio for Ohio law to govern the dispute. Conversely, parties could agree that another
state's law govern a dispute over which Ohio courts had jurisdiction, in which case the
provisions of the Act would be implicated. This Comment, however, proceeds on the
assumption that no such contractual agreement exists between parties.
54 See, e.g., Nadel, supra note 40 (listing numerous cases involving interstate mass
tortfeasors facing multiple awards of punitive damages); see also In re Northern Dist. of Cal.
"Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (well-known
case involving interstate mass tortfeasor facing multiple awards of punitive damages),
vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); Froud v. Celotex Corp., 437 N.E.2d 910 (1. App.
Ct. 1982) (same), rev'd, 456 N.E.2d 131 (11. 1983).
55 The forum state's long-arm statute generally permits the forum state to establish
personal jurisdiction over a defendant having sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).56 Simply stated, a conflict of laws statute allows a court to determine what law to apply
to a controversy involving multistate elements. See JACK H. FREDENTHAL Er AL., CrL
PRocEDURE § 4.5 (2d ed. 1993). A deferential conflict of laws statute is one that adopts the
law of another state with interests involved in the controversy. See id.
5 7 See id. Unless other states enact legislation similar to Ohio's, it is improbable that a
mass tortfeasor will find similar protections from the law of Ohio's sister states. Thus, the
Ohio General Assembly's attempt to protect mass tortfeasors from multiple awards of
punitive damages will be futile in controversies involving such multistate elements.
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The second situation in which section 2315.21(D) will afford protection
from multiple punitive damage awards occurs when the mass tortfeasor is
subject to jurisdiction under the law of another state, but is able to avail itself of
that state's deferential conflict of laws statute.58 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts reports that most states' conflict of laws statutes defer to the law of the
state with the "most significant relationship" to the interest at stake in the
litigation.5 9 Thus, another state's conflict of laws statute might be of assistance
to a defendant in those situations in which the out-of-state claim was brought by
an Ohio citizen seeking punitive damages for a cause of action arising in Ohio
that was the result of the conduct of an Ohio tortfeasor. 60 But, the greater the
connection between the forum state and the tortious behavior, the less likely it is
that the conflict of laws statute will assist the mass tortfeasor.61 Therefore, the
practical result of Ohio's one-bite provision is to protect mass tortfeasors from
multiple punitive damage awards when Ohio has the only significant interest at
stake in the controversy.
In situations in which mass tortfeasors can be sued under the law of another
state, the mass tortfeasor receives protection from Ohio's Tort Reform Act only
insofar as it preempts plaintiffs' ability to recover more than one punitive
damage award under Ohio law. This creates the absurd result whereby citizens
of other states may collect multiple punitive damage awards against an Ohio
mass tortfeasor, while Ohio citizens are relegated to one bite at the punitive
58 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.59See RESTA'iENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFIicr oF LAws § 145 (1971). The Restatement
provides the following general principle:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in
§ 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
Id. at 414-15. See also id. § 147 (same general principle for torts involving damages to
property).
60 See id. § 145.
61 See id.
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damages apple.62 Moreover, in a situation in which, for example, citizens from
ten other states are collecting multiple punitive damage awards against a single
defendant, preempting the ability of Ohio citizens to recover punitive damages
does little to protect mass tortfeasors from "excessive" or "multiple"
punishment. 63
In addition, this preemption does nothing to minimize the risk that Ohio
citizens will be denied ordinary compensatory damages for their injuries if a
mass tortfeasor's funds are depleted through multiple awards of punitive
damages collected by another state's citizens.64 In fact, this precise problem
prompted the New Jersey Supreme Court to state: "Such a cap would be
ineffective unless applied uniformly [across the country]. To adopt such a cap
in New Jersey would be to deprive our citizens of punitive damages without the
62 This assumes that each citizen brings suit under the law of her respective state. It is
important to note that this assumption applies throughout this Comment. This assumption is
based on the belief that the vast majority of tort cases governed by state law are initiated by
that state's citizens. It is true that the Act would prevent citizens of other states from receiving
multiple punitive damages under Ohio law. Conversely, the Act would allow an out-of-state
citizen to receive additional punitive damage awards from a mass tortfeasor in an Ohio court,
if Ohio adopted another state's tort law. Ohio's conflict of laws provision is identical to that
which the Restatement reports. See 4 HARPER & SOLOMINE, supra note 53, § 148.03, at 76-
77 ("The Ohio Supreme Court has now adopted the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws, which essentially directs that the substantive law of the state with the most significant
contacts with the dispute be applied.") (footnote omitted).
63 See Phillips, supra note 37, at 442-43 ("If additional punitive damage awards can be
imposed upon a defendant for the same course of conduct in other jurisdictions, they would
defeat the one-award approach as well as unfairly disadvantage plaintiffs in the restrictive
jurisdiction."); see also Seltzer, supra note 37, at 57 ("Legislative or judicial action on a
state-by-state basis would solve the problem only if all states adopted a uniform cap
system."); Jonathan Hadley Koenig, Note, Punitive Damage "Overkill" After TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources: The Need for a Congressional Solution, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 751, 769 (1995) ("A national legislative solution is preferable to state efforts
at reform for the simple reason that 'one state court cannot bar [its counterpart] in another
[state] from awarding repetitive damages.' Not surprisingly, only a handful of states have
passed legislation specifically targeted at multiple punitive damage awards.").
64 See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 746 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(asbestos manufacturer filing chapter 11 in the face of 38 billion dollars in projected
compensatory damage claims and two billion dollars in projected punitive damages), order
aftd, 52 B.R. 940 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). The goal of torts is, of course, not to bankrupt a
mass tortfeasor. However, in the absence of national uniformity, defendants will necessarily
face such a risk. While this result is admittedly problematic, there is very little the Ohio
General Assembly can do to correct it. If the mass tortfeasor is going to be subject to multiple
and excessive awards in other states, and thus possible bankruptcy, Ohioans should have the
same opportunities to collect remedies as citizens of those other states.
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concomitant benefit of assuring the availability of compensatory damages for
later plaintiffs." 65
One naturally questions the wisdom and equity of a provision, enacted by
the Ohio General Assembly, which benefits other states at the expense of Ohio
citizens. Indeed, placing the citizenry at such a disadvantage is cited as the
primary reason elected representatives would have little incentive to enact such
a law. 66 Despite these concerns, Ohioans are now faced with the rather
unattractive options of foregoing subsequent punitive damage awards
altogether, filing punitive damage claims under another state's law, or winning
the race to the courthouse in hopes of filing the first punitive damage claim in
Ohio.
B. Doctrinal Defects
The Ohio Tort Reform Act significantly undermines the primary goals of
deterrence, law enforcement, and compensation underlying tort law. This Part
will examine the relationship between the Act and these doctrinal goals.
1. Punishment and Deterrence
Divisions (1)(a) and (b) of section 2315.21(D) provide for various caps on
the amount of available punitive damage awards a plaintiff may recover from a
tortfeasor. 67 These distinctions are predicated on the tortfeasor's status.68 Large
employers69 will be subject to a maximum punitive damage award, per course
of conduct, of three times plaintiff's compensatory damages or $250,000,
whichever is greater.70 All other defendants will be subject to a maximum of
the lesser of three times plaintiff's compensatory damages or $100,000 per
course of conduct. 71
While each has the potential to adequately punish and deter tortfeasors in
certain situations, these divisions are also wrought with loopholes that render
judges and juries unable to deal with varying factual circumstances. Indeed, the
65 Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 478 (N.J. 1986).
66 See, e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAw INsr., ENTERPRiSE REsPONSEBIuY FoR PERSONAL
INJURY 261 (1991) ("Ihe state that acts alone may simply provide some relief to out-of-state
manufacturers at the expense of its own citizen-victims, a situation that hardly provides much
law reform incentive for state legislators.").67 See Orso Ray. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(1)(a)-(b) (Anderson Supp. 1996).
68 See id.
69 A large employer is defined as "an employer who employs more than twenty-five
persons on a full-time permanent basis." Id. § 2315.21(A)(3).
70 See id. § 2315.21(D)(1)(b).
71 See id. § 2315.21(D)(1)(a).
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Act's most significant failing is that it takes away the discretionary powers of
the judge and jury, which are necessary to adequately punish and deter civil
wrongdoers. A few simple illustrations highlight these problems.
First, assume that a large employer commits a tort demonstrating flagrant
disregard for the safety of a single plaintiff, 72 resulting in compensatory damage
liability of $100,000. Under division (1)(b), the employer will be liable for a
maximum punitive damage award of $300,000. 73 Whether this punitive damage
award will deter and punish the employer will depend on the employer's
financial status. 74 An employer with a net worth of one million dollars will
likely be punished and deterred from engaging in similar conduct in the future,
whereas an employer with a net worth of 100 million dollars may not. Yet,
neither division (1)(a) nor division (1)(b) gives the court the flexibility to
properly adjust punitive damage awards to account for such basic
considerations. 75
The only available means by which the court can attempt to rectify this
situation is found in division (3)(b)(ii) of section 2315.21(D).76 This division
gives the judge the power to allow additional punitive damage awards when
previous punitive awards are found to be insufficient to adequately punish and
deter the tortfeasor. 77 However, this division applies only to subsequent tort
actions against the same tortfeasor for the same course of conduct.78 Because
the principle of res judicata prevents a plaintiff from bringing a single cause of
action against a defendant once its merits have been adjudicated, 79 division
(3)(b)(ii) is inapposite with respect to a single tort committed against a single
plaintiff. Thus, in situations such as those described in the hypothetical above,
72 Section 2307.801(A) allows for punitive damage awards when a defendant
manufacturer or supplier demonstrates a flagrant disregard for the safety of others who may
be harmed by the product involved. See id. § 2307.801(A).
73 See id. § 2315.21(D)(1)(b). All other defendants, including employers with up to
twenty-five employees, would incur a maximum of $100,000 in punitive damages liability.
See id. § 2315.21(D)(1)(a). A small business with a net worth of five million dollars could
certainly afford such "punishment."
74 It is important to note that the General Assembly allows a jury to consider the
defendant's financial status when awarding punitive damages in a product liability case. See
id. § 2307.801(B)(5). However, this division does nothing to allow the jury to increase a
punitive damage award above the cap to insure that the award reflects a meaningful
percentage of a defendant's income.
75 See id. § 2315.21(D)(1)(a)-(b).
76 See id. § 2315.21(D)(3)(b)(ii).
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See generally I-hrP& SoLoMINE, supra note 53, § 183.04 (explaining that in Ohio,
a judgment rendered on its merits acts as a bar to another suit on the same cause of action).
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the doctrinal goals of punishment and deterrence are effectively nullified.
Even in those situations in which the defendant is a mass tortfeasor,
division (3)(b)(ii) is sufficiently ambiguous to provide defendants with
substantial loopholes for avoiding increased punitive damage awards altogether,
and sufficiently narrow to be of minimal significance when it is applicable.
Upon judicial determination that previous awards of punitive damages for a
single course of conduct are insufficient to punish and deter a tortfeasor, a court
may impose subsequent punitive damages, but must first subtract all previous
punitive damage awards:
The court shall reduce the amount of any punitive or exemplary damages
otherwise awardable pursuant to this section by the sum of the punitive or
exemplary damages awards previously rendered against that defendant in any
state or federal court. The court shall not inform the jury about the court's
determination and action under division (D)(3)(b)(ii) of this section.80
Significantly, division (3)(b)(ii) provides no guidance as to whether this
subsequent award of punitive damages is to be determined in accord with the
prescribed statutory ceiling that applies to initial punitive damage awards. 81
Assuming the ceiling applies to subsequent punitive damage awards, 82 the
provision offers a very limited means of insuring the punishment and deterrence
of tortfeasors.
A second example illustrates the possible limited effect of punitive damages
under section 2315.21(D)(3)(b)(ii). Assume that a large employer manufactures
a product that injures several plaintiffs who all file for punitive damages. If the
initial plaintiff receives both compensatory damages of $100,000 and the
maximum punitive damage award of $300,000, a court will be able to impose
subsequent punitive damages on the employer only when a subsequent plaintiff
incurs compensatory damages greater than $100,000. 83 Considering that each
injury has arisen from the same course of conduct, it is likely that the injuries
80 Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(3)(b)(ii) (Anderson Supp. 1996).
81 See id.
82 This assumption is predicated on the fact that there is no indication that the ceiling,
which applies to all other punitive damage awards, does not apply to this particular situation.
See id. This is an example of a potential "loophole" which well-advised defense attorneys are
sure to exploit. However, if there is no ceiling on the subsequent punitive damages which
may be awarded, the provision could have a very different effect on a mass tortfeasor's
aggregate liability in Ohio.
83 See id.; see also id. § 2315.21(D)(1)(b). Because the subsequent award of punitive
damages is subtracted from the initial award of punitive damages, the subsequent plaintiff's
compensatory damages must be higher than the initial plaintiff's compensatory damages in
order for the subsequent punitive damage ceiling to be higher than the initial punitive damage
ceiling. Only then can a subsequent punitive damage award be above zero.
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will be similar in nature and cost, thus reducing the chances that subsequent
punitive damages will be available. 84
Admittedly, initial plaintiffs may not receive the maximum available
punitive damage award, in which case it becomes more likely that additional
punitive damages could be imposed.8 5 However, it is just as probable that
subsequent plaintiffs will not receive the maximum available punitive damage
award, in which case it becomes less likely that additional punitive damage
awards could be imposed.8 6 One must also consider the possibility that punitive
damage awards from other states, perhaps states without ceilings on the amount
of available punitive damages, will be subtracted from subsequent punitive
damage awards in Ohio.87
In light of these and other plausible circumstances, the likelihood that a
tortfeasor will be exposed to additional punitive damages is greatly
diminished.88 In those instances in which the tortfeasor is exposed to additional
punitive damages, the amount by which the initial award will be increased is
likely to be negligible. 89
84 See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 832-39 (2d Cir.
1967) (noting that numerous future plaintiffs were likely to be awarded damages similar to the
initial plaintiff's damages because they had arisen out of the same course of conduct). But see
Suzanne L. Oliver & Leslie Spencer, Who Will the Monster Devour Next?, FORBES, Feb. 18,
1991, at 75 (commenting on the wide range of injuries caused by exposure to asbestos).
85 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(3)(b)(ii) (Anderson Supp. 1996). Clearly,
the lower the initial punitive damage award, the more likely it is that subsequent punitive
damage awards will exceed the initial punitive damage award.
86 See id. This is simply the inverse of footnote 85. The lower the subsequent punitive
damage award, the less likely it is to exceed the initial punitive damages ceiling.
8 7 See id. Given that many mass tortfeasors are interstate manufacturers, see supra note
54 and accompanying text, it is quite possible that punitive damage awards will exist for the
same conduct in other states. Therefore, even if a subsequent punitive damage award is
available, it stands to be eliminated entirely or be substantially reduced by punitive damage
awards from other states. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(3)(b)(i)-(ii) (Anderson
Supp. 1996).
88 Tese problems are only exacerbated when the tortfeasor is not a large employer.
Because defendants other than large employers are liable for a maximum of $100,000 in
punitive damages, see supra note 73 and accompanying text, the chances of additional
recovery become slim indeed. That is, the lower the ceiling on initial punitive damage
awards, the less likely it is that subsequent punitive damages will be available.
89 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. One can envision a scenario in which the
initial award of punitive damages is low regardless of compensatory damages. This situation
might allow for a subsequently high award of punitive damages that significantly increases the
tortfeasor's liability. For example, assume an initial plaintiff receives a compensatory damage
award of $100,000 and a punitive damage award of $10,000. Upon judicial determination that
this amount was insufficient to punish and deter the tortfeasor, a subsequent plaintiff with
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Clearly, the possible factual scenarios and corresponding results are
endless. These illustrations are simply intended to demonstrate the dangers of
fixing boundaries in this particular area of the law. Without the power to assess
the particular facts of each case and fashion an appropriate solution, the ability
of the legal system to punish and deter mass tortfeasors is severely crippled.
Moreover, the imposition of additional punitive damages has become dependent
upon the fortuitous timing of a few changing variables that often have no
relation to society's outrage at the tortfeasor's conduct.90 This undermines the
fundamental principle that tort law, and punitive damages in particular, is the
means by which the people control the behavior of civil wrongdoers. 91
Ironically, the discretion to exercise this control over local wrongdoers is now
contingent upon the existence of punitive damage awards in other states, thus
creating the anomalous situation in which the people of Texas, for example,
determine whether the people of Ohio can punish a wrongdoer for civil wrongs
committed in Ohio. 92 Unfortunately, the voices of Ohio citizens have been
drowned out by the sounds of irrational legislative line drawing.93
2. Law Enforcement and Compensation
Division (3)(b)(i) of section 2315.21(D) also allows for the recovery of
subsequent punitive damage awards from a tortfeasor for a single course of
conduct when a subsequent plaintiff can show "new and substantial evidence of
previously undiscovered, additional [punishable] behavior." 94 As in division
compensatory damages of $100,000 could recover up to $290,000, in the absence of punitive
damage awards from other states. See generally OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)
(Anderson Supp. 1996).90 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. See also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1967) ("[W]e think it somewhat unrealistic to expect a
judge, say in New Mexico, to tell a jury that their fellow townsmen should get very little by
way of punitive damages because Toole in California and Roginsky and Mrs. Ostopowitz in
New York had stripped that cupboard bare.").
93 One also wonders about the wisdom of not informing the jury that subsequent damage
awards will be reduced by previous punitive damage awards. See Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2315.21(D)(3)(b)(i)-(ii) (Anderson Supp. 1996). While this provision was obviously
intended to protect the defendant from juries "piling on" punitive damages, it also serves to
undermine the retributive nature of punitive damages. See supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text. The jury will only be able to "stick it to a defendant" symbolically
because in reality the award will be significantly reduced. See supra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text. Thus, the defendant escapes the full wrath of society's outrage at the
defendant's behavior, while the jury is left believing it has punished a tortfeasor accordingly.
94 See OHiO Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(3)(b)(i) (Anderson Supp. 1996). This is no
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(3)(b)(ii), any resulting punitive damage award to which the plaintiff might be
entitled is reduced by the sum of all previous punitive damage awards paid by
the defendant in any jurisdiction. 95
Because the construction of this division makes it improbable that
substantial additional punitive damages will be awarded,96 division (3)(b)(i) has
the secondary effect of discouraging certain plaintiffs from filing subsequent
claims for punitive damages against tortfeasors for previously undiscovered
outrageous behavior. Because plaintiffs have little chance of receiving a
substantial subsequent punitive damage award, plaintiffs will have little
incentive to pay the attorney fees associated with pursuing such a claim. 97
Moreover, plaintiffs who cannot afford attorney fees will be less likely to find
an attorney willing to pursue their punitive damage claim on a contingency
basis. This division, therefore, has the unsalutary effect of discouraging
plaintiffs from enforcing the law against outrageous tortfeasors because pursuit
of these claims is economically unproductive.
Similarly, that aspect of punitive damages which compensates plaintiffs for
expenses not ordinarily recoverable will be undermined as punitive damage
awards are reduced or eliminated. 98 Plaintiffs will not truly be made whole, in
the sense that they will not have the satisfaction of exacting retribution from an
outrageous tortfeasor responsible for harming them, nor will plaintiffs be able
to defray the cost of legal expenses, which are not included in the Act's
compensatory damage awards. 99 Thus, division (3)(b)(i) insures that certain
injured plaintiffs will not be put in as good a position upon receiving
compensation as they were before suffering the tortious injury.
C. Constitutional Considerations
The Ohio General Assembly defends the limitations it has placed on
punitive damage awards on several constitutional grounds. 100 Section 5(B)(1)(b)
doubt a reaction to McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990),
in which the court held a Georgia one-bite provision unconstitutional, in part, for failure to
allow punitive damage awards for undiscovered harm caused by a mass tortfeasor. See infra
note 113.
95 See Ormo Ray. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(3)(b)(i)-(ii) (Anderson Supp. 1996).
9 6 See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
97 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
9 8 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
9 9 See OfIo REV. CODEANN. § 2323.54(A)(1)-(2) (Anderson Supp. 1996) (defining the
scope of available compensatory remedies as economic and non-economic damages, neither
of which includes the costs of litigation).
100 See Am. Sub. H.R. 350, § 5(B)(1)(b), 121st Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 1996), 1996 Ohio Legis. Bull. 2046, 2110 (Anderson).
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of the Act states that punitive damage awards have violated the due process
rights of tortfeasors:
[Punitive damage awards have resulted] in violations of the prohibitions against
cruel and unusual punishment of Section 9 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution
and the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and in a
denial of due process of law guaranteed by Section 16 of Article I of the Ohio
Constitution and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States.101
However, in the wake of its attempt to protect the constitutional rights of
mass tortfeasors, the Ohio General Assembly may have trammeled upon the
constitutional rights of those citizens injured by the tortfeasor's conduct. In
particular, limiting the number of punitive damage awards plaintiffs can collect
may violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio
Constitutions. 102
In 1987, the Georgia General Assembly promulgated the Georgia Tort
Reform Act, which contains several provisions similar in nature to provisions in
the Ohio Tort Reform Act.10 3 The Georgia Act also contains a one-bite
provision, which states in pertinent part that "[o]nly one award of punitive
damages may be recovered in a court in this state from a defendant for any act
or omission if the cause of action arises from product liability, regardless of the
number of causes of action which may arise from such act or omission.' 104
In 1990, this provision came under constitutional attack in McBride v.
General Motors Corp.10 5 In this case, McBride brought suit in a federal district
court in Georgia seeking punitive damages for injuries caused by defective
seatbelts manufactured by GM.' 06 Because GM had already paid an initial
punitive damage award for this defect, the Act prevented McBride from
collecting a subsequent punitive damage award; thus, McBride challenged the
one-bite provision on equal protection grounds.107 Interpreting both the federal
and state constitutions, the court found the one-bite provision to be
unconstitutional. 10 8
101 Id.
'02 See U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1; OHno CoNsr. art. I, § 2. This Comment will
address only the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution as understood through Ohio
case law.
103 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (1990).
104 Id. at § 51-12-5.1(e)(1).
105 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
106 See id. at 1565-66.
107 See id. at 1566. McBride also challenged the statute on due process grounds;
however, that claim was irrelevant to the one-bite provision. See id.
108 See id. at 1576.
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The court began by recognizing that the provision "on its face discriminates
between plaintiffs having claims for punitive damages arising out of product
liability actions, inasmuch as [the] provision would limit an award of punitive
damages in product liability actions to the first plaintiff able to win the race to
the courthouse." 109 Because the provision was not directed towards a
fundamental right or a suspect class, the court applied minimal constitutional
scrutiny." 0 Under this test the court examined whether enacting the one-bite
provision was rationally related to accomplishing the General Assembly's goals
of punishing and deterring wrongdoers and facilitating business operations in
Georgia. 111
The court believed that a single punitive damage award, which would bar
all subsequent punitive awards, would be insufficient to adequately punish and
deter certain mass tortfeasors." 2 The primary concern of the court was that the
provision failed to establish a meaningful and substantial award, commensurate
with the wrongdoing committed by a product manufacturer." 3 Similarly, the
General Assembly's goal of facilitating business operations in Georgia was also
rejected." 4 The court found that the one-bite provision was so weighted in
favor of business interests that it was an irrational attempt at balancing the
109 Id. at 1569. The court also addressed the issue of discrimination between plaintiffs
bringing product liability actions and plaintiffs bringing all other tort actions because only the
former was subject to the one-bite provision. See id. The Ohio General Assembly,
undoubtedly aware of this case, made no such distinction between particular actions in tort.
See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (Anderson Supp. 1996). That is, under the Ohio Tort
Reform Act all tort actions are subject to the one-bite provision. See id. However, the
argument might be made that discrimination exists between actions in tort and other
substantive areas of the law allowing for punitive damages. For example, a single contract
violation by a large general contractor might result in punitive damage claims by numerous
subcontractors. See id. §2315.21(A)(1) (exempting civil action for damages for (1) breach of
contract and (2) agreements between persons). Presumably, each subcontractor could collect
punitive damages for a single course of conduct arising under Ohio contract law, whereas a
corresponding remedy in tort no longer exists.
1O See McBride, 378 F. Supp. at 1576.
111 See id.
112 See id. at 1570.
113 See id. The court noted that an initial punitive damage award as low as $50 would
preclude all subsequent awards of punitive damages for the same course of conduct. See id.
The court was concerned with this situation because in many mass tort cases the full extent of
the wrongdoing is not known for some time after the initial punitive damage award. See id.
The court reasoned, therefore, that punitive damages could not be properly calculated to
accomplish the goals of punishment and deterrence without knowing the full extent of the
wrongdoing. See id.
114 See id. at 1569-70.
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interests of Georgia citizens and business entities.115 Accordingly, the one-bite
provision was struck down as unconstitutional because it failed to rationally
achieve legitimate state interests.116
Three years later, however, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld this
provision as constitutional in Mack Truck v. Conkle.117 This time the court
rejected the claim that the one-bite provision violated equal protection
guarantees. 118 Significantly, the court found that the provision did not
discriminate against similarly situated plaintiffs. 119 Rather the court stated,
without explanation, that plaintiffs with product liability claims were situated
differently than plaintiffs with claims arising in other areas of tort law. 120 The
court never addressed whether allowing an initial plaintiff to recover punitive
damages for a product liability claim was discriminatory when subsequent
plaintiffs, also with product liability claims, were denied punitive damages. 121
However, it is implicit in the court's opinion that such treatment was not
considered to be discriminatory.122 Moreover, the court believed the provision
to be rationally related to achieving the Georgia General Assembly's goals of
punishing and deterring tortfeasors.123
Despite the fact that these cases reach exactly opposite conclusions, they do
present a suitable framework in which to analyze the constitutional validity of
Ohio's one-bite provision. Just as in the Georgia cases, the threshold inquiry
under Ohio law for mounting an equal protection attack on legislation requires a
plaintiff to "demonstrate either that there was no rational basis for the creation
115 See id. at 1577. This is a curious result, brought about by judicial sleight-of-hand.
The Act stated that its goal was to "facilitate business." Id. While the Act never advanced a
goal of balancing various interests, counsel for the state argued that the provision was fair
legislation that "balanced the interests of [Georgia's] citizens." Id. The judge turned this
statement into an implied goal of the Act and found the one-bite provision to be an irrational
means of achieving this end. See id. Clearly, the judge faced a much more difficult task when
confronted with the legislature's goal of facilitating business, which the provision certainly
accomplished. This part of the decision seems to be motivated more by policy than logic.
116 See id. at 1578.
117 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993).
118 See id. at 639.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See id. It is implicit in the court's opinion that the Georgia one-bite provision was not
facially discriminatory because the court upheld the provision as constitutional. Presumably, if
the provision were facially discriminatory, the court would have addressed this issue.
123 See id. ("[The provision] effectuates these purposes by providing no ceiling on the
amount of punitive damages which may be awarded. However, this punishment is limited by
the fact that there may be only one such punishment meted out to a products liability
defendant.") (emphasis omitted).
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of the class itself or that those within the class are not being treated equally in
the furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest."1 24 Given the fact that the
provision forces plaintiffs with exactly the same injury from the same tortfeasor
to collect different remedies, Ohio's one-bite statute is discriminatory on its
face. Accordingly, Ohio courts will have to decide whether "there exists any
conceivable set of facts under which the classification rationally further[s] a
legitimate legislative objective." 125 At first blush, this highly deferential
language seems very difficult to overcome. However, the Ohio Supreme Court
has established that such an inquiry is not merely illusory. 126
For example, in Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hospital, the Ohio
Supreme Court applied an equal protection analysis to a statute of limitations
that established a one-year period in which to pursue an action filed against a
hospital for malpractice.' 27 The statute also provided that no plaintiffs, except
children under the age of ten, could file an action more than four years after the
act or omission occurred.128 Children fitting the exception had until their
fourteenth birthday to file. 129 The court examined the relationship between the
statute of limitations and the General Assembly's stated goal of insuring the
continuance of health care delivery to Ohio citizens in the face of a "medical
malpractice crisis." 130 The court found no rational relation between the General
Assembly's goals and the statutory provision:
The statute creates a distinction-without reasonable grounds--between
medical malpractice litigants who are younger than ten years of age and those
who are older than ten but still minors. For example... a child whose cause
of action accrues on the day before his tenth birthday may file an action any
time until his fourteenth birthday. Yet, if the same cause of action accrued on
the day after the child's tenth birthday, the one year (plus notice)
provision... apparently controls. 131
Accordingly, the court struck down the provision as an unconstitutional
violation of the equal protection guarantees of minors over ten.132
Just as the statute of limitations in Schwan was found to have no rational
124 Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 771 (Ohio 1991).
125 Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 452 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (Ohio 1983).
126 See, e.g., id. (striking down legislation for having no rational relation to its stated
objective).127 See id.
128 See id.
129 See id. at 1339-40.
130 Id. at 1339.
131 Id.
132 See id. at 1340.
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relation to its goal of preventing a medical malpractice crisis, the one-bite
provision may be found to have no rational relation to its goals. The strongest
and most obvious argument that the one-bite provision does not rationally
further its stated objectives is that the provision will rarely protect mass
tortfeasors from "excessive" or "multiple" punishment. 133 While the provision
may reduce the aggregate number of punitive damage awards mass tortfeasors
will incur, most mass tortfeasors will still be subject to "multiple" and
"'excessive" punitive damage awards under the law of other states. Thus,
whatever protection a mass tortfeasor may enjoy will be at the expense of Ohio
citizens.' 34 Indeed, turning Ohio citizens into the "sacrificial lamb" of the
nation provides a reviewing court with little incentive to uphold the provision as
a rational means of achieving its end.
Similarly, Ohio courts should question whether placing a ceiling on the
one-bite provision rationally furthers the General Assembly's goal of punishing
and deterring certain tortfeasors. 135 Having once paid a punitive damage award
amounting to a small percentage of its income, a well-advised mass tortfeasor,
able to calculate the cost of future compensatory damages, might be encouraged
to continue engaging in outrageous conduct that proved to be economically
beneficial. 136 Such a tortfeasor has little to fear from a legal system with limited
ability to impose meaningful subsequent awards of punitive damages.' 37 In fact,
an interstate mass tortfeasor that has incurred large punitive damage costs in
states other than Ohio would have strong financial incentive to engage in
economically beneficial punitive behavior within the safety of the legal confines
established in Ohio.138 These concerns illustrate why the one-bite provision
may live a rather short constitutional life.
133 See supra Part lI.A.
134 See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
135 See supra Part III.B.1.
136 See Funk v. Kerbaugh, 70 A. 953, 954 (Pa. 1908) (allowing punitive damages when
defendant conducted blasting operations in a manner likely to shatter plaintiff's buildings
"because it was cheaper to pay damages... than to do the work the usual way."); Owen,
supra note 9, at 1291 ("[A]bsent the punitive damage[ ] remedy, many manufacturers may be
tempted to maximize profits by marketing products known to be defective and to absorb
resulting injury claims as a cost of doing business.").
137 See supra Part lII.B.1.
138 See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. This is because a rational tortfeasor
would want to do business in the state that inflicted the least punishment upon it for
outrageous conduct.
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D. Legislating in the Dark, Sympathy for the Devil, and the Lack of
National Uniformity
The most disturbing aspect of Ohio's one-bite provision is that it protects
the interests of business at the expense of injured plaintiffs without
demonstrating the need for such drastic measures. The General Assembly offers
no empirical evidence to support its conclusion that punitive damage awards are
subjecting tortfeasors to excessive punishment. 139 In fact, the few empirical
studies conducted by impartial parties demonstrate that punitive damages are
neither frequent nor exceedingly large. 14o Unfortunately, the politicization of
139 See Am. Sub. H.R. 350, § 5(B)(1)(b), 121st Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 1996), 1996 Ohio Legis. Bull. 2046, 2110 (Anderson).
140 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 5. The authors state the following with respect to
the frequency of punitive damage awards:
Of the 25,627 civil jury verdicts in the data base for the 1981-85 period, 1,287 or 4.9%
of the cases include punitive awards. This represents 8.8% of the 14,462 cases in which
plaintiffs were successful. The nurmber of punitive damage awards in all but the largest
population centers is below fifty for this five year time period. Only seven sites
experienced more than fifty punitive damage awards ....
Id. at 31. The authors go on to conclude that, "[c]ontraxy to the rhetoric of the [tort]
reformers, punitive damages were not routinely awarded during the early 1980's in the sites
we examined. At its highest level, the punitive damage rate never exceeded one-quarter of all
successful cases or one-fifth of all cases." Id. at 33.
The authors state the following with respect to the size of punitive damages:
[lihe typical jury award overall is also rather modest in most sites. In twelve of the
twenty jurisdictions, the median for money damage cases generally is less than $25,000,
hardly an amount to support the reformers' rhetoric concerning [the] rapidly increasing
award sizes. Only the five California sites and New York County have overall medians
in excess of $50,000....
The results of this study are surprising considering the reformers' rhetoric concerning
punitive damages. In the sites studied, punitive damages were not routinely awarded.
Nor were punitive damages typically given in amounts that "boggle the mind." Juries
awarded punitive damages infrequently, and when they were awarded, the amount was
generally modest.
Id. at 42-43. See also Rustad, supra note 6, at 36-85 (charting product liability cases in
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punitive damages has resulted in the proliferation of anecdotal evidence, which
fails to inform us about the true behavior of the tort litigation system. 141
which punitive damages were awarded from 1965 to 1990 and concluding that punitive
damages have been modest in size and have, in fact, decreased in frequency since the 1980s);
Saks, supra note 5, at 1259-60.
Saks, building on Rustad's study, states:
The most intensive examination of punitive damages in product liability cases has
recently been completed by Rustad. After conducting an exhaustive search of many
sources, he located... 355 such awards in the quarter of a century between 1965-
1990....
First of all, a total of 355 punitive damage awards in product liability cases is not
enormous, considering that each year there are about 21,900 deaths and thirty million
injuries in the United States associated with the use of products.... In view of the base
rate of injuries and the number of filings, the number of punitive damage awards seems
comparatively modest.
The median award sizes from the Rustad study [indicate]... that these awards are
not typically in the multi-million dollar range. Second, punitives are not many times the
amount of compensatory damages. At the trial level, the ratio is only about 1.2:1 and in
more than one-third of the cases, the compensatory damages are actually larger than the
punitives. After adjusting for inflation, no increase in the frequency of large punitive
damage awards over time is evident. Thus, contrary to popular belief, punitive damage
awards are not "skyrocketing."
Saks, supra note 5, at 1259-60 (footnotes omitted); see also Campus Sweater & Sportswear
Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 109 (D.S.C. 1979) ("Twelve years have
now passed, and many of the fears expressed by Judge Friendly have simply not been
realized.... This court is unconvinced that the 'specter of overkill' is anything more than
just that-an unrealized phantom or mental image."), aff'd, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981). But
see Stewart & Piggott, supra note 40, at 697 (stating that punitive damage awards are
frequent, dangerously large, and growing at an alarming rate).
This Comment does not intimate that mass tortfeasors are never exposed to multiple
awards of punitive damages. Rather, the point is simply to suggest that sympathy for such
defendants should be put into a realistic perspective and considered in light of the goals of tort
law. The degree to which the legislature should impede collection of punitive damages ought
to reflect the actual dangers posed to most mass tortfeasors and ought to refrain from
dismantling the law of torts. Legislative measures as drastic as those reflected in the one-bite
provision would perhaps be warranted if multiple and excessive punitive damage awards were
a chronic problem. However, reliable studies suggest that they are not. See Daniels & Martin,
supra note 5; Rustad, supra note 6, at 36-85; Saks, supra note 5. Therefore, a more balanced
legislative solution to the problem would seem to be in order.
141 See Saks, supra note 5, at 1159-60.
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Instead, these "captivating little stories" of plaintiff greed and attorneys who
abuse the system arouse people's emotions and garner political support for
particular interest groups. 142
While politicization is an effective means of winning political battles, it
turns debates concerning punitive damages into matters of "public relations,
propaganda, and the mobilization of prejudice and fear, rather than rational
discourse."' 143 "Under such circumstances, lawmakers are forced to choose
among failing to make needed reforms, making changes on little more than
widely shared assumptions, or making compromises between widely divergent
assertions. [This] legislating in the dark is unlikely to produce constructive
solutions. " 144
Legislation like the Ohio Tort Reform Act is the unfortunate result. Despite
the lack of credible evidence that punitive damage awards are excessive, the
Ohio General Assembly chose to severely limit the ability of injured plaintiffs to
receive punitive damages, thus signifying a significant political victory for Ohio
businesses.
Moreover, the assumption that a defendant should be protected from
multiple awards of punitive damages resulting from his outrageous behavior has
142 Saks, supra note 5, at 1160-61; see also Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 9-14.
Daniels and Martin offer an explanation as to how and why punitive damages have been
politicized. They state that "politicization" is "a way of defining an issue as requiring
immediate public attention in the furtherance of a particular set of political goals.
'Politicization is [therefore] the creation of meaning,' ...." Id. at 10 (citing MURRAY
EDELMAN, POLmCAL LANGUAGE: WORDS THAT SUCCEED AND Poucms THAT FAIL 120
(1977) (emphasis omitted)). The authors further state that "'the striking characteristics of the
link between political problems and solutions in everyday life is that [in the process of
politicization] the solution typically comes first .... Those who favor a particular course of
government action are likely to cast about for a widely feared problem to which to attach [this
solution] in order to maximize its support.'" Id. (citing MURRAY EDELMAN, CoNsTRUCTnNG
THE PoLrncAL SPECTACLE 21-22 (1988)). To this end, Daniels and Martin contend that in the
1980s certain interest groups undertook "an intense, well-organized, and well-financed
political campaign ... seeking fundamental reforms in the civil justice system" that would
benefit themselves. Id. These interest groups attempted to cultivate a state of mind that would
characterize the civil justice system as out of control and creating crisis for American
business. See id. at 10-11. Of course, popular belief in such statements tends to mobilize
political support for legal reform. See id. at 11-12. Popular support for tort reform, therefore,
creates the unusual situation in which the population desires that its power to control civil
wrongdoers be taken away because it believes itself to be incapable of exercising control.
Perhaps if more people understood the goals of tort law, and were less persuaded by
anecdotal evidence, this popular support would diminish.
143 Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 13.
144 Saks, supra note 5, at 1153.
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a somewhat dubious predicate. The concern was best expressed by an Illinois
court, which failed to see why defendants should be "relieved of liability
merely because, through outrageous misconduct, they have managed to
seriously injure a large number of persons." 145 Admittedly, this oversimplifies
the problem by ignoring the fact that defendants should be subject to a finite
amount of punishment for a single wrongful act. However, it illustrates the
point that the tortfeasor, rather than the public, should bear the burden of the
tortfeasor's mistakes. Furthermore, while punitive damages may need to be
limited, they should still be meaningful. 146 Unfortunately, Ohio's one-bite
provision is unduly weighted towards protecting mass tortfeasors.
Finally, the Ohio General Assembly's efforts at protecting mass tortfeasors
from multiple punitive damage awards are misguided because national
uniformity is lacking. 147 As a result, the Act will prevent Ohio citizens from
receiving the same remedies available to citizens of most other states or will
send them to other states to obtain relief in the form of punitive damages."48
Moreover, the one punitive damage award that is available under Ohio law is
enjoyed entirely by the initial plaintiff or plaintiffs. Not only will this create a
rather "unseemly race to the courthouse," but also it will promote serious
inequities between the initial plaintiff and all subsequent plaintiffs. 149 Moreover,
the fact that a plaintiff possesses no legal "right" to a punitive damage award
does little to mitigate the anger that a subsequent plaintiff might feel at such
disparate treatment.' 50
IV. TOWARD A PROCEDURAL SOLUTION
The ideal means of protecting tortfeasors from incurring multiple and
excessive punitive damage awards involves the creation of a federal class
action procedure, in which a defendant would be liable for a single award
of punitive damages to be split between all injured plaintiffs. 151 Of course,
145 Froud v. Celotex Corp., 437 N.E.2d 910, 913 (M1. App. Ct. 1982) (concluding that
a common law cause of action for punitive damages survives the injured parties' demise),
rev'd, 456 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1983).
146 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
148 See supra Part III.A.
149 Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977); see also, e.g., Seltzer,
supra note 37, at 56 (commenting on the competitive race to the courthouse that would
unfairly benefit the first to win the race and addressing the ethical problems that might be
created for attorneys trying to decide which case to pursue first).
150 See Leishman, supra note 40, at 446 nn.41-42.
151 This idea has been suggested in one form or another as far back as the 1930s. See
Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REy. 1173, 1195 (1931)
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the Ohio General Assembly is without the power to enact such a
procedure. Thus, in the absence of federal congressional action, the best
solutions available to the Ohio General Assembly are to allow for
additional procedural safeguards and to trust the discretionary capabilities
(implying that courts should consider joinder of claims or apprise the juries of the other action
in situations involving two or more possible punitive damage awards). Because a federal class
action offers little practical assistance for solving the problems in Ohio, this Comment offers
only a general overview to illustrate that national reform is the most effective means of
solving this problem without dismantling the goals of tort law. For a detailed examination of
the workings of such a class action, see Jones et al., supra note 37; Leishman, supra note 40;
Phillips, supra note 37; Seltzer, supra note 37; Note, Class Actions for Punitive Damages, 81
Mici. L. REV. 1787 (1983).
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for the creation of a class upon
judicial determination that the requirements of "numerosity," "commonality," "typicality,"
and "adequacy of representation" are satisfied. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). If these requirements
are met, a judge must decide which of three class actions specified in Rule 23(b) is the most
appropriate means of adjudicating a particular controversy. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Of
these three types of class actions, only one would prove useful in protecting tortfeasors from
multiple awards of punitive damages. A 23(b)(3) class action would be ineffectual because the
"opt-out" provision would defeat the central purpose for which the class was certified:
protecting mass tortfeasors against multiple punitive damage suits. See id. A 23(b)(2) class
action would also be inappropriate because it applies to actions in which plaintiffs seek
injunctive or declaratory remedies. See id. Given that the very nature of punitive damages is
derived from the imposition of a monetary fine, a financial remedy is indispensable. Rule
23(b)(1) would, however, provide a suitable means of certifying a class under a "limited
fund" theory. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(1) advisory committee's comments.
The limited fund theory is an extension of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), which allows for the
creation of a class when there is a risk of "adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudication." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(1)(B). Mass tortfeasors
facing numerous lawsuits for a course of conduct might have insufficient funds to satisfy all
claims against them, creating a situation in which the interests of subsequent plaintiffs would
be put at risk by the recovery of damage awards by initial plaintiffs. In such situations, a court
can certify a mandatory 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund class. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
Thus, a single punitive damage award, to be split among the members of the class, could be
assessed after compensatory damages were paid to all plaintiffs. The advantages of such a
class action would be numerous: punitive damages would be awarded only after all plaintiffs
have received compensatory damages; all plaintiffs would have equal opportunity to collect
punitive damages; judges could insure that the aggregate amount of punitive liability was
adequate in light of a defendant's financial status after compensatory damages were awarded-
greater judicial efficiency would be accomplished by preventing repeated trials for a single
course of conduct; juries could more accurately determine the appropriate amount of damages
necessary to punish and deter a tortfeasor based on the total harm caused; law enforcement
would be encouraged; and attorney fees would be defrayed.
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of the judge and jury.
Fears of excessive and multiple awards of punitive damages can be
assuaged by considering the possible means of controlling their imposition
upon a mass tortfeasor. A variety of safeguards could be implemented
throughout the trial, and if necessary, appellate review. While the
following examples are certainly not comprehensive, they do illustrate
several simple means of dealing with the problems of multiple and
excessive punishment for a single course of conduct.
First, the General Assembly could make the "clear and convincing"
standard applicable to the burdens of admissibility, production, and proof for all
cases in which plaintiffs pursue subsequent awards of punitive damages. 152 This
safeguard would, of course, necessitate a bifurcated trial so as to avoid
interfering with the plaintiff's compensatory damage claims. 153 The "clear and
convincing" standard would help reduce the number of frivolous claims for
subsequent punitive damages, the number of cases seeking subsequent punitive
damages that would proceed to trial, and the number of subsequent punitive
damages actually awarded. However, punitive damages would remain an
available remedy in situations in which plaintiffs could produce substantial
evidence of outrageous behavior.
Second, the General Assembly could establish that any refusal by the jury
to award punitive damages was not reviewable by the judiciary. 154 This
safeguard should concomitantly establish that whatever amount a jury does
award could never be judicially determined to be unreasonably low. 155 This
should reduce both the number and the amount of subsequent punitive damage
awards.
Third, the General Assembly should set a target amount of maximum
punitive liability to which a defendant may be subject. This amount should be a
percentage of a defendant's total net worth after projected compensatory
damage awards are subtracted. 156 This approach would allow the necessary
flexibility for fashioning meaningful punitive damage awards that adequately
152 Currently this standard is used only when one of the two exceptions to the one-bite
provision is applicable. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(3)(b)(i)-(ii) (Anderson
Supp. 1996); see also supra Part m.A-B.
153 The current system of bifurcation used for trials involving punitive damages would
suffice. See Orio REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(B)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1996).
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 See, e.g., Owen, supra note 9, at 1319 (suggesting that "the total punishment the
enterprise will probably receive from other sources" should be considered when calculating
punitive damage awards).
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punish and deter mass tortfeasors.157 The jury should be instructed to work
within the allotted percentage amount, but would be free to exceed the
percentage under exceptional circumstances.
Fourth, requiring the jury to consider evidence of past and potential awards
of punitive damages to which the defendant might be subject would allow a
mass tortfeasor to present evidence to convince a jury that the tortfeasor has
received enough punishment for a single course of conduct. 158 Similarly, the
jury could assess whether the tortfeasor has been sufficiently deterred by
examining evidence of the tortfeasor's behavior since the imposition of previous
punitive liability.159
Fifth, the General Assembly should explicitly encourage greater judicial
review of excessive punitive damage awards. This review would not be idle
because judges possess the power of remittitur, which allows them to reduce
unreasonably high damage awards. 16° The General Assembly could state its
intention that judges apply stricter scrutiny to cases involving mass tortfeasors
and could suggest greater use of this power when the dangers of excessive and
multiple punitive damage awards arise.
Finally, appellate courts could be given the power to review subsequent
punitive damage awards de novo. This would allow appellate courts greater
flexibility to overrule or reduce excessive punitive damage awards allowed by
lower courts.
Admittedly, these safeguards are an imperfect solution to a problem that is
best solved at the federal level. 161 However, a defendant is not entitled to a
perfect trial, only a fair one.162 Thus, the aforementioned procedural safeguards
offer a much more equitable means of balancing the competing interests of
business and the goals of tort law. While this solution will not eliminate all
excessive or multiple awards of punitive damages, it should significantly reduce
157 See supra Part Ill.D.
158 See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 459-60 (Wis. 1980) ("The
danger of excessive multiple punitive damage[ ] awards can be avoided in Wisconsin because
the jury may consider the wealth of the defendant which would include consideration of
compensatory and punitive damages and fines and forfeitures already imposed on the
defendant or likely to be imposed on the defendant.").
159 See Owen, supra note 9, at 1316 ("If, for example, the defendant can [show] that it
voluntarily terminated the misbehavior... the need for specific deterrence would be
correspondingly diminished.").
160 See generally 5 HAPER & SOLOMINE, supra note 53, § 184:02 (explaining that Ohio
courts have the power of remittitur allowing them to reduce excessive jury awards).
16 1 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
162 See generally 17 Omo JUR. 3D Constittional Law §§ 644-47 (1980) (explaining the
nature of due process rights under the Ohio and federal constitutions).
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the number of defendants exposed to such liability.' 63 Moreover, if excessive
and multiple punitive damage awards are as rare as studies suggest,' 64 the
creation of additional safeguards will truly render them "more theoretical than
real." 165 What liability a mass tortfeasor might incur will have been imposed
only after numerous actors within the legal system have decided that punitive
damages were warranted-a decision made within a system greatly favoring the
defendant's interests. In the face of such protections, claims that multiple
awards of punitive damages violate a mass tortfeasor's due process rights
should garner little sympathy.
Most important, these safeguards respect the fundamental goals of tort law
and punitive damages. That is, the ability of the people to control the behavior
of civil wrongdoers through punishment and deterrence is restored, while the
tangential goals of encouraging law enforcement and compensation are
satisfied. 166 This is achieved, in part, by trusting the discretionary abilities of
the judge and jury. Moreover, this solution recognizes that only through case-
by-case analysis can these goals be accomplished and the interests of justice be
met. These safeguards would also restore to Ohio remedies available in most
other states, thus eliminating any advantage citizens of other states might have
over Ohio citizens with respect to collecting remedies for tortious injury. 167 In
this manner, a more logical and equitable policy would be promoted. Finally,
because these safeguards treat all similarly situated plaintiffs equally,
constitutional violations would be of no concern. 68
V. CONCLUSION
To the victor goes the spoils. Business interest groups have won the battle
over tort reform in Ohio. However, the war is far from over. Undoubtedly, the
Ohio Tort Reform Act will be challenged on constitutional grounds in the near
future. While the result of such a challenge is uncertain, it is clear that the
political climate in Ohio will play an important role in the future of punitive
damages. Thus, until popular myths are dispelled, punitive damages will
continue to be widely opposed, despite the fact that the remedy is by the people
and for the people. In the interim, the Ohio Supreme Court may be the last line
of defense in the war over tort reform.
163 While these safeguards will do nothing to prevent a mass tortfeasor from exposure to
multiple awards of punitive damages under the law of other states, that problem is best solved
by those states or the federal government, not the Ohio General Assembly.
16 4 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
165 Owen, supra note 9, at 1325.
166 See supra Part II.
167 See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
16 8 See supra Part mH.C.
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